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Summary 
The European Council, Parliament and Commission are about to start trilogue negotiations over the 
revision of the posting of workers Directive (PWD) of 1996. The aim of the revision is to ensure, 
among others, the principle of equal pay for equal work at the same place, limit the maximum 
posting duration and address increasing involvement of temporary work agencies in the business. 
The past year has shown how acutely sensitive these issues are and arriving at this point has 
required substantial political capital.  
Some have argued that this energy would have been better spent elsewhere, but in fact for some 
member states a lot is at stake. Postings have a large impact on (net) receiving countries such as 
Belgium, particularly when looking solely at its construction sector where posted workers make up 
25% of the Belgian workforce. Likewise, in some (net) sending countries, such as Slovenia, outgoing 
posting makes up 7% of overall employment. A restriction on posting would have significant 
ramifications in these labour markets and for fiscal/social security revenues.  
The proposed revision is unlikely to render the majority of postings unprofitable, but some postings 
may disappear. In any case, those participating in the upcoming trilogue on posting will have to be 
mindful of the consequences for the single market while addressing the shortcomings in the current 
PWD. 
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nformal debates on a potential revision of the posting of workers Directive (PWD)1 have 
been with us ever since the accession of new member states in 2004 and 2007. After much 
spent political capital and many fierce debates, the Council decision by Labour and Social 
Ministers earlier this week on October 23rd and today’s plenary vote in the European Parliament 
paves the way for a revision of the Directive. The next step will be the trilogue procedure of 
reconciliation between the Parliament, Commission and Council. Some have argued that this 
energy would have been better spent elsewhere, but for some member states (and their 
workers) a lot is at stake. 
1. What are posted workers and where does the system create tensions? 
Posted workers are persons sent (posted) by their employer to another member state to 
provide services on a temporary basis. While abroad, they remain in their home countries’ 
social security system and continue to pay contributions there for up to 24 months.2 This avoids 
a disproportionate administrative burden of switching between social security systems when 
the workers are only temporarily providing services in another member state. In addition, a 
‘hard core’ set of terms and conditions of employment determined by the host country must 
be respected according to the PWD. It is worth noting that self-employed persons are not 
covered by the PWD. Since the Directive deals with temporary cross-border service provision, 
it is based on legislation governing the single market. 
While free movement of labour has also featured heavily in recent political discourse (e.g. in 
the Brexit debate), posting has created tensions of its own. According to the original Directive, 
posted workers have to respect the minimum wage arrangements in the receiving countries 
but can otherwise exploit their cost competitiveness. Of course, a posted worker may be hired 
– and many are – because the particular skillset is not available on the local labour market or 
due to higher productivity of the foreign worker. For a significant proportion of posted workers, 
however, cost competitiveness plays a crucial role. This is where the wage differences across 
countries come into play, since a posted worker from a low-wage country may be willing to 
work for a wage that is significantly below the average local remuneration. When the PWD was 
first implemented, the ratio of the highest to lowest wage was 3:1, whereas today it is has risen 
to more than 7:1 (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
1 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
2 Based on Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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Figure 1. Ratio of highest to lowest average wage in an EU 
 
Notes: Wage = Average compensation per employee. Luxembourg has been excluded.   
Data source: AMECO. 
Domestic minimum wages provide some measure of safeguard, but some member states fear 
downward wage pressure and speak allegorically of ‘social dumping’. Opponents of the revision 
point to the single market, which rests on the free provision of services across borders, and 
assert that posting as such cannot be considered ‘unfair competition’. The PWD can be seen as 
an instrument to manage the tension between the heterogeneity of social systems and wage 
conditions across member states and the freedom to provide services throughout the 
territory.3 
Particularly over the past year, this debate has led to a deepening division between some 
member states, which is often portrayed as pitting the East against the West, i.e. net sending 
vs. net receiving countries.4 The PWD, in particular the rules governing the remuneration of 
posted workers, is also at the epicentre of the Commission’s call for ‘fair mobility’, which was 
echoed in President Juncker’s 2017 State of the Union speech. The issue is clearly of political 
importance. But it is imperative to keep in mind that posting also matters from a macro-
perspective. As is often the case, however, the impact is highly heterogeneous across countries 
and economic activities. 
2. Why posting matters economically 
In 2015 – the latest year for which data are available – just over two million workers/self-
employed received a so-called A1 form. It establishes a presumption that the holder is properly 
affiliated with the social security system of the member state which has issued the certificate. 
It is issued to posted workers, among other groups, when they temporarily provide their 
services in other member states (Figure 2).  
                                                 
3 M. Barslund and M. Busse (2016), “Labour Mobility in the EU: Addressing challenges and ensuring ‘fair mobility’”, 
CEPS Special Report No. 139, CEPS, Brussels. 
4 M. Barslund and S. Blockmans (2016), “Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility”, CEPS 
Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 12 July. 
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Figure 2. Increase in the number of postings in the EU, 2005-15 
  
Notes: The same person can be posted several times in any given year. Figures include also workers active in more 
than one member state; in 2015 only 1.5 million individuals were defined as posted workers.  
Data source: European Commission. 
These two million workers make up 0.9% of total EU employment, so roughly 1 in 100 workers 
falls into this category. Not all of them are actual posted workers, however. Moreover, postings 
on average only last 98 days, although exact numbers are not available for some member 
states. Nevertheless, this means that in terms of full-time equivalency their share in 
employment shrinks to 0.4% of employment. 5 
In other words, the revision deals with around one-half of 1% of EU workers. But does that 
mean that posted workers, economically speaking, constitute a marginal issue? 
That depends on one’s perspective. As a start, compared with the regular mobility flow – i.e. 
people moving from one member state to another – it is of the same order of magnitude.6 
Hence, it may be marginal for the EU as a whole, but from the perspective of certain member 
states or sectors it is not. For example, Slovenia issued 127,000 A1 forms in 2015, which would 
correspond to 13.5% of its employment. Even taking into account the previously mentioned 
caveats, the reliance on posting is remarkably high, accounting for around 6% of employment. 
In the case of Slovakia and Poland, the unadjusted share is 4% and 3%, respectively. From the 
                                                 
5 J. Pacolet and F. De Wispelaere (2016), “Posting of workers - Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2015”, 
study commissioned by Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, European Commission, 
December. 
6 C. Alcidi, M. Barslund, M. Busse and F. Nicoli (2016), “Will a European unemployment benefits scheme affect 
labour mobility?”, CEPS Special Report No. 152, CEPS, Brussels, December 
(https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR152%20EUBS%20and%20Labour%20Mobility.pdf). 
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perspective of the receiving country, posted workers account for 4.5% of total employment in 
Belgium.7 
3. The sectoral impact 
Secondly, some sectors are more affected than others. The construction sector is responsible 
for more than one-third of all postings and here the local impact can be significant. 
Unfortunately, only a few member states publish the outgoing postings by sector. But among 
those that do, one can take the example of Slovenia where the number of full-time equivalent 
posted workers accounts for 46% of all construction employment.8 In other words, nearly every 
second Slovenian construction worker is posted abroad. 
From a receiving-country perspective, Belgium faces the largest impact (see Figure 3). In that 
country’s construction sector posted workers make up over 25% of employment in 2016. This 
figure has tripled since 2007, when they constituted only 8% of construction employment. This 
is in addition to general mobility patterns across the EU, which in the case of Belgium, is similar 
to those of posting flows.   
Figure 3. Received posted workers in the construction sector (% construction sector 
employment) 2016  
 
Note: The figures are not adjusted for full-time equivalence.  
Data sources: European Commission and AMECO. 
                                                 
7 F. De Wispelaere and J. Pacolet (2017), “The size and impact of intra-EU posting on the Belgian economy. With a 
special focus on the construction sector”, HIVA, KULeuven.  
8 This is a cautious estimate since the applied average duration of postings from Slovenia was used in the 
adjustment and it can be assumed that the duration in the construction sector was longer than the overall average. 
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What is more, it is not just about the current number but also about the dynamics (cf. Figure 
2). Overall posting has increased between 2010 and 2015 by 40%. But Belgium is now receiving 
nearly twice as many posted workers as it did in 2010, and at the same time, the number of 
postings from Slovenia has increased by 40% per year within the same period. 
All of this indicates that posted workers can have a pronounced impact on some segments of 
domestic labour markets. Faced with the challenges implicit in these numbers and trends, it is 
understandable that the Belgian authorities, confronted with job displacement and downward 
pressure on wages and social security contributions, seek EU remedies. But this is only one side 
of the coin. 
Some countries have become very dependent on the opportunities created by the PWD and 
many jobs are potentially at stake. It may reach levels that would noticeably affect public 
finances. A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation in the box below shows the potential losses 
for the Slovenian state.  
Economic effects of posting: The case of Slovenia 
If we estimate that around 100,000 posted workers were sent abroad in 2015 from Slovenia, that 
would give 50,000 full-time equivalent postings. Almost three-quarters of Slovenian posted workers 
are sent to either Austria or Germany where the average wage is 1.8 and 1.6 times higher than in 
Slovenia. Let’s assume for simplicity that Slovenia’s posted workers are earning at least the Slovenian 
average annual wage of €25,000 when working abroad. Consequently, posted workers provide 
€1.25 billion of taxable income to the Slovenian state, which translates into more or less €300 million 
in taxes, corresponding to almost 1% of GDP or 2% of annual government revenues. Moreover, as 
social security contributions of the employee and employer are also paid in the home country, the 
loss to the Slovenian state could potentially reach around €500 million.    
If postings were to be substantially restricted or made unprofitable, a large chunk of these revenues 
and social security contributions would disappear, since not all of those workers would be easily 
absorbed by the Slovenian economy in the short run. This would leave a sizable hole in the budget 
balance and social security system, over and beyond the rise in expenditure due to increased 
unemployment. Logically, other countries would gain in turn. 
  We derive this estimate by combining information from the number of A1 forms issued and the average length of posting 
per A1 form (Posted workers country fiche, Slovenia: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=15207&langId=en). 
  Calculated on the basis of applying tax rates/social security rates to the average wage in Slovenia. If one were to apply 
the minimum wage of Germany (one of the two main recipients) of €18,000 the figures would be slightly lower, but studies 
have shown that posted workers on average earn significantly above-minimum wages. 
 For a similar exercise, see F. De Wispelaere (2015), “Posting of workers: The impact of social security coordination and 
income taxation law on welfare states”, HIVA Working Paper. 
The case of Slovenia and the other examples cited above show that the impact of a substantial 
restriction on postings would have profound ramifications for certain countries or sectors. 
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4. Proposals on the table 
The big question then is whether the proposed revision will render posting substantially less 
profitable and therefore less likely. 
The aim of the Commission’s proposed changes to the PWD is not to unduly restrict posting, 
but rather to protect the rights of posted workers. The slogan “equal pay for equal work at the 
same place” is a repeated refrain throughout the debate everywhere. In practise, the 
Commission’s proposal would replace “minimum rates of pay” with normal remuneration with 
respect to the entitlements of posted workers, aside from the minimum wage and standard 
labour rights. Moreover, universally applicable collective agreements would be binding for 
posted workers in all sectors – this is currently only the case for the construction sector. 
Another key change is the proposed restriction on the duration of a posting to 24 months; 
thereafter the posted worker would become a regular domestic worker, with all the attendant 
rights and obligations. Lastly, the revision targets postings via temporary work agencies, which 
have become more prevalent in the posting business, and seeks to ensure a level playing field 
and to safeguard the rights of posted workers. 
With the plenary vote in the European Parliament, the legislature’s position is now finalised - 
the EP Employment Committee voted with a large majority in favour of the position last week, 
on October 16th. In large part, the Parliament followed the Commission’s proposal. An 
important difference is the expansion of the legal basis for the Directive. The PWD has so far 
been based on legislation related to the four freedoms, whereas the Parliament proposes to 
extend the legal basis to also cover the social acquis. While it may seem like a minor change, 
some countries will take issue with this implicit shift from posting being an exclusively internal 
market issue towards becoming a labour standards issue. This shift may eventually have 
important implications for future rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
Parliament was expected to have shortened the maximum duration of posting, but it kept in 
line with the 24-month maximum suggested by the Commission. In its proposal, the Council 
advocates changing the maximum period to a 12-plus-6-month rule.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the positions of the Commission, Parliament 
and Council must now be reconciled within the Trilogue and discussions will commence soon. 
Since the gap between the three positions is not enormously wide, it can be expected that a 
compromise will be reached in due time. 
5. How will posting be affected? 
The potential impact of the PWD revision is hard to assess a priori, but it is unlikely to render 
the average posting unprofitable. Notably the differences in social security contributions will 
remain and these can be sizable.9 Labour shortages in some professions will not disappear and 
                                                 
9 European Commission (2016), “Impact Assessment”, SWD(2016) 52 final, page 78ff, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2016/EN/SWD-2016-52-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 
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will continue to be filled via postings (as exemplified by the fact that 50% of postings take place 
between high-wages countries). Moreover, the principle of equal pay for equal work at the 
same place does provide some leeway to negotiate wages according to productivity, skills, 
experience, etc.; thus, in practise a posted worker may still earn less (or more) than the average 
domestic worker. However, some postings in which the worker currently earns just above the 
minimum wage will be affected. Data on Polish posted workers in Germany, however, show 
that most of them earn well above the minimum wage.10 In general, aside from the basic salary, 
some other forms of remuneration and benefits will now be available to posted workers which 
will increase the total labour cost related to postings.  
Furthermore, posting will become administratively more burdensome. Member states will be 
required to publish all legalities and elements of remuneration applying to workers posted in 
that country on a single website. Staying abreast of changes to sectoral wage agreements and 
other forms of remuneration could make posting of workers too costly for smaller companies. 
For longer postings, there is the added complexity of transferring the worker to the same status 
as a regular ‘host country worker’ after 12(+6) months, and to the host country’s social security 
system after a maximum of currently 24 months. The latter maximum duration may be changed 
within the on-going revision of the social security coordination regulation,11 but it is not certain 
that it will perfectly align with the PWD.12 The impact assessment conducted by the 
Commission at the start of the proposed revision argued that the overall effect will be small. 13 
It is well known, however, that accurate data on the number and length of postings are not 
available for all countries and sectors, let alone data on current wages and benefits accruing to 
posted workers. Hence, assessing the likely impact is fraught with uncertainty. As pointed out 
earlier, the details matter and show that in some sectors of some countries the revision may 
have more profound implications. 
Fortunately, the proposal foresees a transposition period of three years plus one additional 
year before the revised Directive comes into force. Therefore, the impact will not be immediate 
and economic actors can adapt their business models and become familiar with the new 
requirements. 
This in turn may also lead to new ‘innovative posting schemes’ aimed at circumventing the 
requirements, just as some black sheep currently attempt to do, e.g. via letter-box companies 
or the provision of overpriced company-organised housing, which factually reduces the 
effective wage for the posted worker. To reign in such fraudulent behaviour, the European 
                                                 
10 M. Benio (2016), “Labour costs in cross-border services”, Kraków University of Economics, April. 
11 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
12 See also the call for a broader debate: F. De Wispelaere and J. Pacolet (2017), “Posting of workers: a call for a 
broader debate”, opinion piece, Euractiv, 4 September (http://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-
jobs/opinion/posting-of-workers-a-call-for-a-broader-debate/).  
13 European Commission (2016), “Impact Assessment”, SWD(2016) 52 final, page 78ff, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2016/EN/SWD-2016-52-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 
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institutions initiated the enforcement Directive,14 which by now has been transposed into 
national law in most member states. It is too early to assess the extent to which the 
Enforcement Directive has achieved this objective, but in any case, the supervision of postings 
across-borders is a challenging task as it requires substantial cross-border cooperation between 
labour market agencies.  
In this context, it is not surprising that the idea of a European Labour Authority has recently 
gained momentum. Such an agency would, ideally, provide a nexus connecting national labour 
authorities and ensure a consistent level of surveillance inter alia of adherence to the PWD. The 
establishment of a European Labour Authority would be politically challenging, however, and 
is bound to be met with strong resistance by national governments over the principle of 
subsidiarity since e.g. labour inspections remain a national competence. It would also be 
difficult to implement in practise.15 
6. Conclusion 
In a well-functioning and deeper single market for services, there is no escape from the concept 
of posted workers. Hence, it is imperative that the practise is carefully and thoughtfully 
regulated. In a Union with more homogenous social security systems and smaller wage 
disparities, this could be addressed relatively easily as a mere technical issue. Faster 
convergence of wages between low- and high-wage countries – a process that largely came to 
a halt with the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 – would surely help to make the issue less 
toxic among member states. But until such a scenario becomes a reality, posting will continue 
to be a political hot potato. With a four-year waiting period before the revised Directive comes 
into force, assuming the trilogue runs smoothly, and with numerous national elections as well 
as one for the European Parliament being staged in the interim, it is a safe bet that we have not 
heard the final word on the subject of posted workers. 
                                                 
14 Official Journal of the European Union 2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/fr/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0067).  
15 M. Beblavý (2017), “Is Juncker’s enthusiasm for a common labour authority premature?”, CEPS Commentary, 
18 September 2017. 
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